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Why the Politics of Marriage Matter: Evaluating Legal 
and Strategic Approaches on Both Sides of the Debate on 
Same-Sex Marriages 
 
Kenneth K. Hsu* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This article examines the progress of gay rights activists in the 
pursuit of legalizing same-sex marriage. After some initial success in late 
2003 and early 2004, the same-sex marriage movement encountered a 
wall of opposition to its cause. Rather than carrying the wave of success 
forward, the movement’s progress stalled in the lead-up to the 2004 
presidential election and, in fact, new barriers to same-sex marriage were 
raised. While gay rights activists knew that their battle for same-sex 
marriage would need to be hard-fought, the ferocity and effectiveness of 
their opposition found them unprepared. The timing of certain events 
may have had a part to play. For example, same-sex marriage was a hot-
button election issue in 2004. Both presidential candidates from the 
nation’s two major political parties in 2004 were explicit in their 
opposition to same-sex marriage; their opposition was politically 
calculated in an attempt to win votes from the medium voters.1 But this 
article will argue that a contributing factor to the same-sex marriage 
movement’s falter has been its ineffectiveness at playing the politics of 
marriage. 
In order to consider this premise, this article will provide an 
overview of the historical events that have taken place during the 
campaign for same-sex marriage to date. I will then draw upon these 
events and analyze the rhetoric employed by the same-sex marriage 
proponents, on the one hand, and their opposition, on the other. The 
 *Associate attorney, McInerney & Dillon P.C., Oakland, California. J.D. (2005) Boalt Hall 
School of Law. I am indebted to Professor Herma Hill Kay for supervising this project and for 
encouraging me to publish and present this paper at BYU. I want to thank Professor Lynn Wardle of 
J. Reuben Clark Law School for reviewing the initial draft of this paper and for inviting me to the 
Federal Marriage Amendment Symposium. Many thanks to Ed and Kelly Kang, Chris and Julie Lee, 
and Carmen Hsu. This paper is dedicated to my pen pals from Taiwan: Shawn Tsai, Alex Lee, and 
Venice Jiang. 
 1. See, e.g., Paul Furhi, Kerry Again Opposes Same-Sex Marriage, WASHINGTON POST, 
AO6, May 15, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28118-
2004May14.html. 
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findings show a wide disparity in the theories espoused by gay rights 
activists. This article will describe several of these theories in detail, 
most notably, the “assimilation” theory. In light of these theories, I will 
assess what went wrong for same-sex marriage proponents in the game 
of politics leading up to the 2004 presidential election. Flaws can be 
detected in the strategic approach of the same-sex marriage proponents in 
contrast to the approach of their opposition. I will conclude by asserting 
that the same-sex marriage proponents need to argue for their case on a 
common ground with their opponents, using arguments that will appeal 
to the mainstream electorate. The “assimilation” theory would be the 
preferred theory for building these arguments and should be embraced as 
a way forward for same-sex marriage proponents. 
 
II.  THE VICTORIES AND FAILURES OF THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
MOVEMENT 
 
A.  The Last Five Years: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 
 
In his 2001 essay “All Together Now,” Evan Wolfson, then Marriage 
Project Director for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and co-
counsel for the plaintiff in the landmark case of Baehr v. Andersen,2 
declared, “We can win the freedom to marry . . . possibly. . .[this] is 
doable within five years.”3 Wolfson’s optimism was based on his 
confidence in the ability of gay rights activists to form political alliances 
with religious, labor, child welfare, youth, senior, and business interest 
groups and constituencies. In addition, Wolfson mapped out what he saw 
as an effective, multi-faceted strategy to obtain gay marriage rights: take 
the same-sex marriage issue to courts; take the issue public through news 
media and television talk shows like Oprah; use social science research 
to convince the public of the positive impacts of same-sex marriage on 
society; use statistics to demonstrate general public support for same-sex 
marriage; and link the issue of the same-sex marriage to social issues 
such as childcare, family law, senior care, social security, and 
 2. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In this case, the Hawaii Supreme Court stopped short of 
recognizing the freedom of same-sex couples to marry, but the case is credited with sparking the 
national discussion about same-sex marriage. Although in 1996, the Court ruled that the state’s 
marriage policy violated the state Constitution’s prohibition against sex-based discrimination by 
denying the freedom to marry to lesbian and gay couples, the judge stayed his decision to allow the 
state to appeal to the Hawaii Supreme Court. In 1998, anti-gay groups succeeded in passing a state 
constitutional amendment to grant the legislature a new power to “reserve marriage” to heterosexual 
couples only. On December 9, 1999, the Hawaii Supreme Court determined that the case was now 
“moot” due to the change in the state constitution. 
 3. Evan Wolfson, “All Together Now,” in MARRIAGE AND THE SAME-SEX UNIONS at 3 
(Lynn D. Wardle et al. eds., 2003). 
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healthcare.4
Explicit in the strategy of Wolfson and other gay rights activists has 
been the understanding of same-sex marriage as a political struggle, a 
surely difficult—but winnable—fight in the democratic political 
process.5 They all recognized that scholarly research and debates, court 
fights, and publicity would need to be deployed creatively in order to 
convince the public, policymakers, and lawmakers of the merits of same-
sex marriage. 
Initially, these strategies seemed to be resulting in “victories” for 
same-sex marriage advocates. The most notable of these “victories” was 
the historic decision handed down by the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court on November 18, 2003 in the case of Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health6 (“Goodridge”). In that case, the court ruled 
that Massachusetts’ ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional.7 
Shortly following that decision, on February 4, 2004, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court stated in an opinion submitted to the state Senate 
that only full, equal marriage rights for same-sex couples, not civil 
unions, are constitutional.8
Following the lead from Massachusetts, on February 12, 2004, San 
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsome authorized city clerks to grant 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. One week later, after sanctioning 
more than 2,800 same-sex marriages, the City of San Francisco sued the 
State of California to challenge the ban on same-sex marriages on 
constitutional grounds.9
The response to Massachusetts’ judicial decisions and San 
Francisco’s initiative in enabling same-sex couples to legally wed was 
bittersweet for gay rights activists. These local victories boosted the 
optimism of gay rights activists across the country that they could 
eventually win the fight for same-sex marriage.10 Full media coverage of 
these local victories gave same-sex marriage activists’ cause 
 4. Id. at 6-9. 
 5. See, e.g., Mubarak Dahir, Marriage on his mind: longtime crusader Evan Wolfson sets 
out to win same-sex marriage rights within five years - Pride 2003 at THE ADVOCATE, June 24, 
2003, available at http://www.looksmarttrends.com/p/articles/mi_m1589/is_2003_June_24/ai_ 1053 
67738. 
 6. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 7. See id. For a more substantive discussion of Goodridge, see Section III (B), infra. 
 8. Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, SJC-09163 
(2004), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/conlaw/maglmarriage20304.html. 
 9. See S.F. Sues State over Gay Marriage Ban, ASSOCIATED PRESS, February 20, 2004, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,111935,00.html. 
 10. See, e.g., Kathleen Burge, Decision on Out-of-Staters in Courts’ Hands, BOSTON GLOBE, 
at B9 May 18, 2004, available at http://www.boston.com/news/specials/gay_marriage/articles 
/2004/05/18/decisions_on_out_of_staters_in_courts_hands/. 
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unprecedented attention. The fallout of the media attention, however, 
was a ferocious counterattack from the political right. It was only after 
the successes in Massachusetts and San Francisco that the anti-same-sex 
marriage campaign became highly politicized and, ultimately, 
successful.11 The potency of the opposition unveiled by gay rights 
activists’ small victories were stronger than gay rights activists expected 
or for which they were prepared. 
Debate over same-sex marriage was one of the major issues that 
dominated the airwaves for most of 2004. In response to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Goodridge, 
Republican President George W. Bush declared in his 2004 State of the 
Union Address that the “nation must defend the sanctity of marriage 
between a man and a woman.”12 Both the Democratic and Republican 
presidential candidates spoke openly against the legalization of same-sex 
marriage in their 2004 campaigns. Leading up to the election, there was 
ongoing pressure for the Republican-dominated Congress to pass the 
Federal Marriage Amendment—a proposed amendment to the United 
States Constitution that would define marriage as between a man and a 
woman only. 
Less than one year after initial successes in Massachusetts and San 
Francisco for gay rights activists, the confidence of same-sex marriage 
proponents was weakened by the concerted efforts of political and 
religious conservatives to prohibit same-sex marriage. In the November 
2004 national and state elections, voters in eleven states approved 
constitutional amendments codifying marriage as an exclusively 
heterosexual institution,13 with eight of the eleven states containing 
additional language that could also ban civil unions and other legal 
protections for gay and lesbian people.14 All of the state amendments 
were passed by large margins.15 President Bush, widely regarded as the 
“more” anti-same-sex marriage candidate in the 2004 election and a 
strong supporter of the Federal Marriage Amendment, was considered to 
have been reelected partly due to an increased turnout by religiously 
 11. Stanley Staley Kurtz, The “Gay” Election, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE , Feb. 10, 2004, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz200402100850.asp. 
 12. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address 2004, WHITE HOUSE.gov, Jan. 20, 
2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004 /01/20040120-7.html. 
 13. The eleven states are Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Utah and Oregon. 
 14. The eight states are Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma and Utah. In early 2004, voters in Missouri and Louisiana also approved amendments 
banning same-sex marriage. See Same-sex Marriage Bans Winning On State Ballots, CNN.com, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/02/ballot.samesex.marriage/index.html. 
 15. Id. 
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conservative voters who opposed same-sex marriage.16
With electoral victory in 2004 for the Republican Party in both the 
executive and legislative branches, the Federal Marriage Amendment 
was again a major priority on the religious right’s political agenda.17
For gay rights activists, the last five years moved them one step 
toward their objective with initial wins in Massachusetts and San 
Francisco. However, it appears that they ended the period two-steps 
back. The thrust of their opponent’s defense suppressed the flow of 
optimism from their initial wins. More potent, however, are the legal 
barriers that have been created in eleven states where marriage has been 
codified as an exclusively heterosexual union. The question that needs to 
be addressed is why gay rights activists’ multi-faceted strategies could 
not withstand the defense of the opposition. 
 
B.  How Same-Sex Marriage Proponents Missed Their Mark 
 
There are four observations to be gleaned from the failure, to date, of 
the struggle to legalize same-sex marriage. First, although the same-sex 
marriage movement attained some early success, that success sparked a 
huge backlash from the opponents of same-sex marriage. Second, anti-
same-sex marriage proponents were able to mobilize and energize their 
base, especially religious conservatives, quickly. This efficiency was 
quickly translated into votes. The backlash was not only cultural or 
religious, but also political; political actors were able to capitalize on 
media exposure and voters’ reactionary attitudes to reach their political 
goals.18 Third, the defeat of presidential candidate John Kerry and other 
Democrats at the polls prompted commentators, including some from the 
liberal establishment, to question the Democratic Party’s commitment to 
a leftist social agenda.19 In short, some journalists interpreted the 
Democrats’ electoral losses as a result of the party’s over-commitment 
 16. See Richard Benedetto, The Morality Vote was Out There for All to See, 
USATODAY.COM, Nov. 6, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/columnist/benedetto/2004-
11-06-benedetto_x.htm. 
 17. See Jim Drinkard, Rove Speaks Out on Bush’s Win, USA TODAY, at 11A, Nov. 8, 2004. 
The contrary view is that the conservatives only use the same-sex marriage issue during election 
years as a hot-button election issue to turn out conservative voters, and will not bring out the FMA 
as a serious issue in the Congress. 
 18. See, e.g., Kevin Potvin, Whose “Moral Values?” THE REPUBLIC, Nov. 11 to 24, 2004, 
http://www.republic-news.org/archive/101-repub/101_potvin_values.htm. 
 19. For example, the prominent and influential California Senator Dianne Feinstein had 
explicitly said that certain Democratic Party members’ support of the gay marriage issue had been 
“too much, too fast, and too soon” and had helped “energize a very conservative vote” in the 
November 2004 election. See Carolyn Lochhead, Gay Marriage: Did Issue Help Re-elect Bush?, 
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, at A1, Nov. 4, 2004, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin 
/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/11/04/MNG3A9LLVI1.DTL. 
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and alignment with an overly ambitious social agenda that endorsed gay-
marriage.20 Fourth, five years after Wolfson’s declaration that 
legalization of same-sex marriage was “doable within five years,”21 
proponents of same-sex marriage face an increasingly hostile and 
powerful opposition, while at the same time, it appears they have fewer 
and fewer politically powerful allies. 
All four observations lead to a more general conclusion that Wolfson 
and those who agreed with him were overly optimistic. Their strategy 
became the victim of its own success. All of the legal and political tools 
employed by same-sex marriage proponents were met with highly 
formidable and organized tools from the “conservative right.”22 The 
result has been the “conservative right’s” victory in the polls—one of the 
main battlegrounds. Currently, the same-sex marriage debate rages on, as 
more voters are willing to amend their state constitutions to ban same-
sex marriage. Proponents of same-sex marriage attempted to use the 
politics of marriage in this cultural war, but the “conservative right” has 
proven more adept at politicizing this issue. 
Same-sex marriage proponents predominantly entered the arena by 
bringing judicial actions (such as Goodridge) and by petitioning the 
executive branches of local governments (such as the Mayor’s Office of 
San Francisco). A medley of theories was used by advocates, including 
an individual rights theory based on the right to privacy and the theory of 
equal protection under the law. Both of these theories will be defined and 
analyzed below. It will become clear in this analysis that these two 
theories alone, putting aside other theories also used by same-sex 
marriage proponents (some of which are discussed in this article), have 
very different philosophical bases. These internal conflicts present same-
sex marriage proponents with difficulty in presenting a united front both 
in making their arguments and refuting arguments made by their 
opponents. The conservative political machine was easily able to exploit 
these theories and design and shape a campaign based on broad 
community values that defeated the same-sex marriage agenda within the 
political arena. The events of 2004 clearly demonstrate that gay rights 
activists need to change their approach in the political arena to appeal to 
voters at large. 
 
 20. See, e.g., Walter Shapiro, Presidential Election May Have Hinged on One Issue: Issue 1, 
USA TODAY, at 6A, Nov. 5, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/columnist 
/shapiro/2004-11-04-hype_x.htm. 
 21. Wolfson, supra note 4, at 3. 
 22. See, e.g., Kathleen K. Ruthledge, Full Court Pressure, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Vol. 49, 
No. 1, at 58-59 (January 2005); Sheryl Henderson Blunt, The Man Behind the Marriage Amendment, 
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Vol.48, No. 9, at 46 (September 2004). 
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III.  THEORIES FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
 
In this section, the “assimliation theory” is introduced as a moral and 
social foundation for same-sex marriages. Following this introduction, 
the article will examine the two legal theories used to support the 
majority’s ruling in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case of 
Goodridge, namely, the right to privacy and the right to equal protection 
under the law. In turn, these two theories will be compared to the 
assimliation theory to see whether the underlying bases of these two 
theories can be accommodated by the assimliation theory. In order to 
understand gay rights activists’ framing of same-sex marriage arguments 
in the political arena, one needs to pay close attention to how such rights 
are articulated and debated both in the public square and among activists. 
The rhetoric of privacy and equality can take on different forms with 
very different meanings. 
 
A.  Assimliation Theory 
 
“The centerpiece of [the] new [homosexual] politics …  is equal access 
to civil marriage”23                                         
                                                                -Andrew Sullivan 
 
Gay rights commentators, scholars, and activists place a high 
premium on homosexuals’ access to marriage. Andrew Sullivan called 
this access the “centerpiece” of homosexual politics and the most public 
symbol of equality for gays and lesbians.24 Sullivan framed the right to 
same-sex marriage as a necessity for gays and lesbians to be accepted in 
society,25 because marriage is a fundamental civic institution. Under this 
conceptual framework, legalization of same-sex marriage allows gays 
and lesbians to participate fully in civic life. This is the essence of the 
“civil rights” or, what is referred to in this article, the “assimliation” 
argument.26 “Marriage . . . is a social and public recognition of a private 
commitment . . . the highest public recognition of personal integrity. 
Denying it to homosexuals is the most public affront possible to their 
public equality.”27 Legalization of same-sex marriage for the assimliation 
 23. Andrew Sullivan, Virtually Normal, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL 
DEBATE, 126 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., Prometheus Books 1997). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 
709 (2002). 
 27. Sullivan, supra note 24, at 126. 
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is about civil rights, equality, and public recognition. The “assimliation” 
theory calls for the state to extend marriage rights to homosexual 
couples. The idea of “assimilation” itself implies that the outsider is 
brought into the mainstream. The purpose of this theory is to recognize 
gay individuals and couples as “normal,” and allow them to enjoy the 
substantive and symbolic benefits that accompany marriage. 
Consequently, the underpinnings of the “assimliation” argument of 
the same-sex marriage agenda can be considered moral and social. The 
theory is moral in the vision of a society in which this right to marry is 
accepted, recognized, and granted. The theory is social in the sense that 
the entrant needs to assimilate into the society, and the social, religious, 
and civil institutions need to accommodate the entrant. Therefore, the 
“assimliation” argument is not unlike the arguments employed by the 
desegregation movement and women’s rights movements of the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s. The assimliation argument paints a picture of a 
disadvantaged group that is being denied the fundamental right to marry, 
which is a right that is enjoyed and taken for granted by heterosexual 
couples. The social dimension of the argument pertains to the rights, 
privileges, and benefits that accompany the right to marry. 
Assimliationists maintain that the institution of marriage is not only a 
symbol of equality for gays and lesbians, but also a substantive necessity 
for gays and lesbians to participate, and be benefited equally, in society. 
Being able to marry brings the right to the same-sex partner’s healthcare 
benefits, pensions, and other benefits that are available to heterosexual 
married couples. Christine Pierce notes in her article, Gay Marriage: 
 
What drives this issue is the practice of most United States employers 
and many institutions (such as the IRS) to give significant benefits 
including health, life, disability and dental insurance, tax relief, 
bereavement and dependent care leave, tuition, use of recreational 
facilities, and purchase discounts on everything from memberships at 
the local Y to airline tickets only to those in conventional heterosexual 
families.28
 
Pierce refers to these rights and entitlements as the “monetary and 
benefits” argument for same-sex marriage.29
What makes the monetary and benefits argument a pertinent element 
in the “assimliation” articulation of same-sex marriage right is the 
argument’s appeal to principles of equality. These benefits, just like the 
 28. Christine Pierce, Gay Marriage, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL 
DEBATE 169 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997). 
 29. Id. 
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right to marry, are taken for granted by married heterosexual couples. In 
this regard, the gay rights movement shares common similarities to the 
desegregation and feminist movements, but whereas those movements 
were successful in relating to the general public, the gay rights 
movement has found it difficult to relate to “the conservative right.” In 
I’s view, the gay rights activists have not been able to relate to the 
“conservative right” because assimliations have been unable to articulate 
the “assimliation” theory in convincing political terms. 
Given its moral and social underpinnings, the assimilationist 
proponents’ main target of focus should be the political arena. 
Assimliation theory’s arguments seemingly have the potential to appeal 
to voters on a large scale by appealing to the public’s sense of what it 
means to be American. By explaining that same-sex couples should be 
included in the society of married couples, assimliationists remind 
Americans that the United States is a country that puts stock in the 
concepts of fairness and equality. Similarly, the monetary and benefits 
argument is also an easy concept for a majority of people to understand. 
 
B.  Legal Arguments Used in the Goodridge Ruling 
 
In Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that 
barring an individual from civil marriage solely because that person 
would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts 
Constitution. The decision was based on both the right to privacy and the 
doctrine of equal protection under the law. Marshall, C.J., for the 
majority, stated: 
 
Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil 
marriage, a person who enters into an intimate, exclusive union with 
another of the same sex is arbitrarily deprived of membership in one of 
our community’s most rewarding and cherished institutions. That 
exclusion is incompatible with the constitutional principles of respect 
for individual autonomy and equality under law.30
 
Further, in explaining how to reconcile the two theories, she states: 
 
The individual liberty and equality safeguards of the Massachusetts 
Constitution protect both “freedom from” unwarranted government 
intrusion into protected spheres of life and “freedom to” partake in 
benefits created by the State for the common good . . . Both freedoms 
 30. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003). 
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are involved here. Whether and whom to marry, how to express sexual 
intimacy, and whether and how to establish a family – these are among 
the most basic of every individual’s liberty and due process rights . . . 
And central to personal freedom and security is the assurance that the 
laws will apply equally to persons in similar situations . . . The liberty 
interest in choosing whether and whom to marry would be hollow if the 
Commonwealth could, without sufficient justification, foreclose an 
individual from freely choosing the person with whom to share an 
exclusive commitment in the unique institution of civil marriage.31
 
The two theories – the right to privacy and equal protection – as 
applied to same-sex marriage are considered in-depth in the next two 
sections. I will then assess the political effectiveness of each theory in 
the context of the broader cultural war regarding same-sex marriage. 
 
C.  Exploring the Right to Privacy 
 
1.  An issue of Constitutional Rights, not moral opinions 
 
In contrast with assimilation theory, some same-sex marriage 
proponents who focus on the right of privacy argument frame the legal 
arguments for same-sex marriage as “an issue of constitutional rights, not 
moral opinions.”32 Embedded in the legal rhetoric (following Goodridge) 
has been an explicit rejection of morality and values as the underlying 
substance to same-sex marriage’s policy rationale. 
For example, Brenda Feigen, attorney and co-founder of the National 
Women’s Political Caucus and Ms. Magazine, emphasizes the 
individual’s right of privacy as the valid constitutional ground for the 
U.S. Supreme Court to afford same-sex couples the right to marry.33 By 
couching the legal case for same-sex marriage in terms of the right of 
privacy, Feigen compared same-sex marriage to abortion rights. “The 
Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
viewed marriage and procreation . . . as so fundamentally personal that 
the state should not intrude . . .”34 In addition to making this analogy, 
Feigen viewed the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas35 as 
the precursor of extending marriage rights to gay couples. “Drawing on 
 31. Id. at 954. 
 32. Brenda Feigen, Same-Sex Marriage: An Issue of Constitutional Rights not Moral 
Opinions, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 345 (2004). 
 33. Id. at 347. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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Casey’s focus on individuals’ most intimate and personal choices, 
including the right to create one’s own concept of existence and 
personhood, the Lawrence majority reached the crucial conclusion that 
‘persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these 
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.’”36 To Feigen, since the right 
to choose to have “intimate conduct” is protected under the Constitution, 
the next logical step would be to extend the rights of privacy to the right 
to marry. As highlighted in the previous section, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court did apply the right of privacy to the right to 
marry. Marshall, C.J. stated that the court owes “great deference to the 
Legislature to decide social and policy issues, but it is the traditional and 
settled role of courts to decide constitutional issues.”37
 
2.  Can the right to privacy be applied to the assimliation theory? 
 
The arguments used by right to privacy advocates are problematic 
for same-sex marriage proponents who rely on the assimliation theory. 
This is not because the rights to privacy arguments are unsound, but 
rather because they lack the same kind of moral underpinning that is 
associated with the assimliation argument. In other words, under the 
assimliation argument, the right to marry is a right denied arbitrarily by 
the state, along with many other rights and benefits that heterosexual 
married couples take for granted. Denying the right to marry denies one’s 
rightful participation in an important aspect of civic life. However, by 
framing the right to marry as a fundamental right of privacy (as the 
Supreme Court had defined the marriage right under this category),38 and 
the right of privacy being a constitutional issue within the purview of the 
judiciary, the position takes away the moral force of the assimliation 
argument. 
In fact, Feigen and others are explicit in rejecting references to 
morality with respect to the principle of the right to privacy. For 
example, Professor Chai Feldblum, cited by Feigen in her article, was 
even concerned that in the case of Lawrence v. Texas,39 the majority’s 
reasoning in supporting homosexual rights was “dangerously predicated 
on moral views.”40 Professor Feldblum argues that by referring to 
 36. Brenda Feigen, Same-Sex Marriage: An Issue of Constitutional Rights not Moral 
Opinions, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 345, 348 (2004). 
 37. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 966 (Mass. 2003). 
 38. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). “The present case, then, concerns a 
[marital] relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional 
guarantees.” Id. at 485. 
 39. 539 U.S. 558. 
 40. Brenda Feigen, Same-Sex Marriage: An Issue of Constitutional Rights not Moral 
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grounds of morality “‘the [C]ourt wants to leave itself the leeway to 
announce, at some later date, that the institutions of marriage or military 
could not withstand the influx of openly gay couples or individuals.’”41 
In essence, Feigen and Feldblum are worried that the Court’s open 
reference to “current public moral views” could be an impediment to 
marriage rights for homosexuals in the current political environment and, 
generally, leaves the right to marry for same-sex couples at the whim of 
the then current political environment. The right of privacy argument is, 
in their view, best articulated without reference to morality or public 
opinion. 
This explicit rejection of moral reasoning and public opinion from 
the “right of privacy” line of legal reasoning cuts against the grain of the 
assimliation argument. The legally sound argument may find some 
success in courts, but piecemeal decisions across state courts will not win 
widespread support for gay rights. The right to privacy issue is difficult 
for the general public to understand, and arguments based on individual 
rights may not have the same political pull as rights based on community 
values. The battle will never be won with finality in a courtroom unless 
the voting public accepts gay rights. This right to privacy reasoning 
deviates from the basic premise of the assimliation argument, which 
emphasizes the institution of marriage as a public institution with 
tremendous civic and the political importance. The assimliation 
argument makes marriage an entitlement and a benefit that ought to be 
recognized and accepted by all citizens. It goes further, stating that the 
government, as well as the public, should recognize marriage as an 
important right and a public institution that should be encouraged. By 
recognizing the marriage institution as such, the logical inference from 
the assimliation point of view is that the government and the public in 
general are in the business of regulating marriage as an institution. 
If the assimliation argument is to have any success in the broader 
political arena, then the discussion surrounding the right to same-sex 
marriages cannot exclude public opinion and morality. To do so would 
alienate the majority of the voting public from the debate. The concern 
that a right based on morality is subject to the whims of current opinion 
forsakes arguments predicated on morality grounds that can be made in 
favor of same-sex marriage. For example, the perspective on the role of 
marriage in civic life can be viewed as favoring the extension of 
marriage rights to gay couples. 
The politics of the right of privacy reasoning can be seen as making 
Opinions, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 345, 349-50 (2004). 
 41. Id. 
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same-sex marriage rights an exclusively “gay” issue. Such politics can 
easily polarize the public. The right of privacy argument makes it sound 
as if marriage is exclusively about “our business, our right, our choice, 
and our privacy, therefore, everyone (in particular, the government) 
should leave us alone.” This not only alienates the public, but it has the 
unfortunate effect of not educating the public about the issue and not 
communicating the merits of same-sex marriage to the larger audience. 
 
3.  Does the right to privacy stand up against the “conservative right”? 
 
Conservatives, and particularly the “religious right” were able to 
oppose same-sex marriage in a way that resonated with voters precisely 
because they were able to frame the institution of marriage as a public 
issue. The conservatives’ strategy is exactly the opposite of the right of 
privacy argument. Conservatives have been more successful in 
articulating the important role that traditional marriage plays in the 
American public life, than same-sex marriage proponents have been in 
convincing the public of the benefits of including same-sex couples into 
married society. This was the case in the lead up to the 2004 election, 
regardless of the legal merits of the argument. The conservatives’ 
success is explored in more detail in Section IV. 
In short, the right of privacy argument is counterproductive and is 
unlikely to resonate with the electorate. Although the American people 
value the right to privacy, they do not see it as universal and absolute. 
Most Americans and the government have demonstrated their support for 
the right of privacy in areas of abortion rights (Roe v. Wade42), in the 
right to intimate relationships between adults (Lawrence v. Texas43), and 
in end-of-life matters, such as the Terry Schiavo episode that took place 
in 2005. The Terry Schiavo episode during the spring of 2005 has 
demonstrated how a large percentage of Americans do believe that the 
right of privacy in intensely personal matters is a right that ought to be 
respected by the government.44
However, all of the examples listed above relate to decisions over 
one’s body; marriage involves choosing with whom to share an exclusive 
commitment, but it is much more. Its meaning, benefits, role in public 
life, symbolism, tax consequences, and other attributes are defined by the 
public and regulated by state and federal governments. In this regard, 
assimliations can find a common ground for argument with the 
 
 42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 43. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 44. See Gary Langer, Poll: No Role for Government in Schiavo Case, ABCNEWS.COM, Mar. 
21, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/PollVault/story?id=599622&page=1. 
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“conservative right,” which generally favors more government 
intervention in social issues. 
 
D.  Exploring the Equal Protection Theory 
 
1.  Equal application of the law regardless of sexual orientation 
 
The equal protection argument was the other legal argument that was 
successfully employed by the plaintiffs in Goodridge. The equal 
protection argument for same-sex marriage was first used by the 
Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans to abolish unlawful treatments and 
classifications based on sexual orientation.45 In Romers, the Supreme 
Court held that a state constitutional provision that identifies persons by 
their homosexual orientation and then denies them the right to seek any 
specific protections from the law is a violation of the equal protection 
principle. Such a state provision implied animosity toward such persons 
and is thus not related to any legitimate state interest.46 The premise of 
the equal protection argument is that the law shall be applied equally to 
persons in similar situations regardless of one’s race, sexual orientation, 
or gender. 
 
2.  Can the equal protection theory be applied to the assimliation theory? 
 
The equal protection argument is consistent with the assimliation 
argument. It emphasizes the state’s obligation not to discriminate based 
on suspect classifications. The equal protection doctrine emerged from 
the case of Brown v. Board of Education,47 in which it was decided that 
segregation of public school students simply based on their race violated 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The equal 
protection methodology of Brown is closer to the ideology articulated by 
the assimliation camp than that presented by the right of privacy 
argument. Barring a same-sex couple from the right to marriage solely 
because that person wishes to marry a person of the same sex violates the 
right to equal protection under the law. Barring a person from civil 
marriage also bars that person from the benefits, protections and 
obligations of marriage. It is not fair to deny a person the attributes that 
flow from the status of being married because that person wants to marry 
a person of the same sex. 
The social element of the assimliation theory correlates with the 
 45. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 46. Id. at 626-27. 
 47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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basic and universal concept of fairness and equal treatment underlying 
the equal protection theory. Similarly, the equal protection doctrine also 
carries a certain moral and ideological vision, like that underlying the 
assimliation theory. Equal treatment not only confers the benefits of the 
right, which is being applied to all, but there is a certain status associated 
with having that right. These social and moral elements could be more 
difficult for conservatives to challenge, at least in the electoral arena, 
because these concepts - fairness, equal treatment, and moral values - 
resonate with the voting public at large. 
Another reason that the equal protection argument may resonate 
better with the conservatives is that the theory does not have some of the 
qualities that conservatives disdain about the right of privacy argument. 
“Right of privacy” is nowhere to be found in the language of the 
Constitution, while the equal protection clause is found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution. The phrase “All men are created equal” 
is arguably the best-known phrase in any of America’s documents. These 
observations are relevant, because many conservatives and especially 
those who are strict constructionists do not favor policy unsupported by a 
plain reading of the law. Furthermore, as mentioned above, for a same-
sex marriage argument to have any resonance with conservative voters, 
one needs to speak in a language that the listeners can understand and 
from which they will not be intrinsically alienated. 
 
3. Is the equal protection theory supported by all same-sex marriage 
proponents? 
 
Some proponents of same-sex marriage may be uncomfortable with 
the equal protection doctrine. First, there is a risk that legislators may 
provide same-sex couples with the benefits of marriage without actually 
conveying the status of marriage. Second, equal protection exists in the 
public realm and is therefore subject to the vagaries of the public system. 
The first concern with the equal protection doctrine is the risk that 
application of the doctrine may result in a two-tier system. In order to 
provide same-sex couples with the benefits of marriage, without 
changing the definition (explicit or normative) of “marriage” to include 
same-sex couples, the legislature may create a separate right for unions 
between same-sex couples. This has been the case in Vermont where 
civil unions between homosexual couples are recognized by the state, but 
marriages are not.48 Some proponents of same-sex marriage and gay 
 48. 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1201 (WESTLAW, through 2005). 
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rights activists are not happy with the two-tier system.49
A second problem with the equal protection theory is that the public, 
the politicians, and the courts determine which people are entitled to 
equal protection and its material benefits. This aspect of the equal 
protection doctrine does not necessarily work against proponents of 
same-sex marriage who advocate the assimliation theory because that 
theory is premised on access to marriage as a public symbol of equality 
for gays and lesbians. The proponents of the right to privacy, however, 
could argue that under this theory, the right of privacy is an inherent, 
fundamental right outside the reach of the government. 
It is interesting to note this inherent tension between the theories of 
equal protection and the right of privacy, because the ways in which 
these theories play out in the politics of marriage have determined, and 
will continue to determine, the effectiveness of the same-sex marriage 
movement as a whole. 
 
E.  Conclusion 
 
This Section has described the fundamental theories with respect to 
same-sex marriage rights that have been debated to date in the public 
arena, namely, the right to privacy and the equal protection doctrine. 
Although these two theories were both used to support the decision in 
Goodridge, there are inherent tensions between these two theories. In 
addition, with respect to the assimliation theory (supported by many 
same-sex marriage proponents as a potential strategy in the fight for 
same-sex marriage), the right to privacy is inconsistent with the moral 
underpinning of the assimliation theory. The right to privacy argument 
has been used successfully in the judicial realm with respect to same-sex 
marriage rights, but it has less potential to win in the broader political 
debate because it does not focus on broad community values. 
When a theory fails to be politically persuasive, it needs to be re-
examined. In other words, for proponents of same-sex marriage to be 
successful in using the political process, they need to find the theory and 
the stance that is most accessible to the public and makes the most sense. 
Of the two theories used in Goodridge, the equal protection theory 
appears to be more accessible than the right of privacy and it has the 
potential to be used in the broader assimliation theory. I will describe in 
later sections how the rhetoric of the right of privacy, among other 
things, has not contributed to a successful political strategy to date. Prior 
 49. See Sherry Corbin, Why Civil Unions Aren’t Enough, March 2004, VERMONT FREEDOM 
TO MARRY TASK FORCE ONLINE, www.vtfreetomarry.org/notenough.php. 
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to that discussion, the next section describes and examines two 
alternative theories in support of same-sex marriage rights. 
 
IV.  ALTERNATIVE THEORIES TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
 
A contributing factor to the same-sex marriage movement’s falter 
has been its ineffectiveness at playing the politics of marriage. As 
explained below, a big contributing factor in the movement’s 
ineffectiveness has to do with the inability of the movement to argue for 
their case on a common ground with their opponents, using arguments 
that will appeal to the mainstream electorate. Especially detrimental to 
the movement’s effectiveness and unity is some gay rights commentators 
and scholars’ theories, which undermine and are directly in conflict with 
some of the more mainstream arguments for same-sex marriage. I would 
call them the alternative theories to same-sex marriage.  
There are two alternative theories to the concept of same-sex 
marriage. The first alternative theory, in this article referred to as the 
“changing marriage concept” theory, does not base its premise on the 
assimilation of homosexuals into the heterosexual “mainstream,” but has 
the goal of transforming the heterosexual concept of family.50 One 
example of this type of transformation would be the passage of 
legislation that would not impose monogamy on married couples. 
The second alternative theory is entirely against the idea of same-sex 
marriage. This idea is borrowed from feminist scholars who reject the 
institution of marriage as a patriarchal institution. This theory rejects 
same-sex marriage on the basis that it reinforces the oppressive and 
coercive nature of heterosexual marriage and family life.51
On the surface, these two alternative theories seem to be unrelated to 
the current debate and politics of same-sex marriage as described in 
Section III above. In fact, these alternative theories present formidable 
obstacles for gay rights activists striving to legalize same-sex marriage. 
The assimliation tendency of the same-sex marriage movement has been 
to attempt to “normalize” homosexual unions, to present them as 
complementary to and part of American civic life. The alternative 
theories, which are inherently opposed to the mainstream “family 
values,” are completely at odds with the “normalized” picture the 
assimliations have attempted to portray. 
These alternative theories are presented here to highlight the 
disparity in the views of gay rights activists toward the same-sex 
 50. See Richard D. Mohr, The Case for Gay Marriage, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE 
MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 84, 96-98 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997). 
 51. See Robson, supra note 27. 
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marriage debate. Although it evidences the depth of discussion and 
critical thought being invested in examining the status of same-sex 
couples, the disparity of views creates opponents for same-sex marriage 
proponents within the gay rights community itself. In addition, it makes 
it difficult for same-sex marriage proponents advocating any of the same-
sex marriage theories to present a unified view of same-sex marriage 
outside the gay rights community. Furthermore, these theories need to be 
understood in order to see how they may impact the political rhetoric 
surrounding the same-sex marriage debate. Understanding the alternative 
theories will also help to identify any common or complimentary 
arguments within these theories in the application of the three theories 
already discussed, specifically, the assimliation theory, the right to 
privacy and the equal protection doctrine. 
 
A.  Transforming the Traditional Notion of Marriage 
 
I advocate the legalization of same-sex marriage. My analysis does not 
in the main proceed by appeal to the concept of equality; in particular, 
nothing will turn on distinctive features of [the?] equal protection 
doctrine. Rather, the analysis is substantive and turns on 
understanding the nature and meaning of marriage itself.52 
 
                                                                      -Richard D. Mohr 
 
Same-sex marriage proponents who wish to transform the traditional 
meaning of marriage reject its normative definition and content. In order 
to deconstruct the traditional notion of heterosexual marriage, “changing 
marriage concept” proponents must first deconstruct traditional marriage 
before adding the homosexuals’ normative meaning and content. 
Necessary to their argument is the rejection of the more traditional and 
yet powerful argument for same-sex marriage—the appeal for equality, 
as highlighted by Mohr in the quotation above.53 To accept the equal 
protection argument, for example, is to concede that the homosexual 
arrangement, lifestyle, and family are inferior to their heterosexual 
counterparts, because when one strives to be on equal footing with 
another party (e.g. a family-oriented lifestyle), he or she is conceding that 
he or she is not on equal footing or is lacking a quality that makes his or 
her position inherently unequal. 
“Changing marriage concept” proponents do not deny the 
 52. Mohr, supra note 51, at 86. 
 53. Id. 
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importance of the right to marry, but the goal of attaining that right is not 
about assimilation, benefits, or civic participation. The purpose is to 
inject homosexuals’ normative meaning and content into “marriage” and 
“family,” because normative content for traditional marriage lacks 
legitimacy. 
Mohr asks his readers: “If one asks the average Jo(e) on the street 
what marriage is, the person generally just gets tongue-tie(d). Try it.”54 
What “changing marriage concept” proponents are asserting here is that 
because the normative meaning and the content of heterosexual marriage 
are so unstable and precarious, it is pointless for lawmakers and the 
courts to define marriage as something as definitive as a union between a 
man and a woman. Assimliations would be more inclined to agree that 
the term “marriage” has normative content, whether the term includes 
homosexual couples or not. For example, the normative content may 
include a monogamous relationship between spouses and shared 
responsibility in raising and educating children. 
Drawing on the distinctive experience and ideals of gay male 
couples, Mohr argues that gay couples can be models of marriage and 
family life.55 Mohr’s model posits that monogamy is not an essential 
component of love and marriage, because sexual exclusivity is not 
essential to marital commitment.56 Instead, emotional interdependence 
transcends these concerns.57 Mohr’s model also argues that common-law 
marriage should be favored over marriage licensing or solemnization: 
 
For people are mistaken to think that the sacred valuing of love is 
something that can be imported from the outside, in public ceremonies 
invoking praise from God or community. Even wedding vows can 
smack of cheap moral credit, since they are words, not actions. The 
sacred valuing of love must come from within and realize itself over 
time through little sacrifices in day-to-day existence.58
 
In other words, Mohr argues that the state should get out of the marriage 
business, because for gay couples, marriage is about commitment, love, 
and mutual support, not state registration. In his view, even the ceremony 
is unnecessary because words can be “cheap”;59 the commitment, love 
and mutual support is realized through the build-up of day-to-day 
 54. Id. at 87. 
 55. Id. at 57. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 96-97. 
 58. Id. at 93-95. 
 59. Id. 
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actions. 
For Mohr, the normative definition and content of traditional 
marriage is unworkable for gay and lesbian couples. Unlike the 
assimliations, Mohr sees fundamental differences between the model for 
gay couples and the traditional notion of marriage. Mohr believes that the 
model for gay couples is a superior form that the normative definition of 
marriage should imitate. Mohr’s argument and proposal certainly have 
theoretical merit, especially considering that the normative definition of 
marriage is reasonably static. But how does Mohr’s theory work in the 
politics of marriage? First, the non-monogamous or non-regulated model 
of marriage is certainly outside today’s mainstream concept of marriage. 
In fact, this concept is diametrically opposed to what many would 
consider to be the underpinning values of marriage. For example, the 
ideal marital relationship is monogamous. In addition, marriage is both a 
private and a public event. The wedding is ceremonial and public; it is 
acknowledged and sanctioned by the state. The married couple receives 
special status, privileges, and benefits. The status, privileges, and 
benefits are acknowledged, accepted and expected. 
Removing the public and the state-sanctioning dimensions from the 
normative content of marriage reduces the rationale for the rights, 
benefits, and privilege entitlements bestowed upon married couples. This 
is one reason why the “changing marriage concept” proponents do not 
strictly subscribe to the equal protection argument. If marriage ceases to 
be a normative, public institution, or if married couples do not desire 
acknowledgment and recognition, proponents of same-sex marriage 
cannot make an equal protection argument on the grounds that they 
deserve these rights and benefits. When rights, benefits, public 
affirmation, and civic participation are not part of the normative content 
of marriage, marriage is less about its institutional function and social 
value, and more about the privacy and the norms defined by the marriage 
partners. 
In reality, marriage (as we know it) is both private and public. By not 
seeking equal protection and by couching the normative content and 
language of marriage in the vocabulary of the right to privacy, use of the 
“changing marriage concept” theory by proponents of same-sex marriage 
would be a definite set back in the political arena. As was discussed in 
the previous section of this article, the language of “privacy,” unlike a 
normative description of the public role and recognition of marriage, is a 
less effective argument in the political arena. The right of privacy can be 
a potent weapon in the courtroom, but the politics of marriage require a 
content much more accessible and politically appealing than a rhetoric 
that is only theoretically plausible. 
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In addition, the non-monogamous model within the “changing 
marriage concept” theory is certainly not going to translate into a real 
political advantage. More fundamentally problematic is the theory’s 
inherent opposition to the value-driven concept of both traditional 
marriage and the assimliation view of marriage. The incompatibility 
between the “changing marriage concept” theory and the “assimliation” 
theory is something that proponents of same-sex marriage need to work 
out. Otherwise, proponents of same-sex marriage cannot have a unifying 
and effective voice in advancing the same-sex marriage cause. 
 
B.  Gay Rights Activists Who Oppose Same-Sex Marriage 
 
Some of the fiercest critics of same-sex marriage are gay rights 
activists, scholars and those from the “radical” feminist tradition. These 
critics borrow from feminist scholars who reject marriage as a patriarchal 
institution. Although this rejection of marriage is the flipside of the 
feminist critique of marriage, the homosexual critique of marriage has its 
own rationales and perspectives. 
These rationales and perspectives are critical to how the politics of 
same-sex marriage plays out in the greater context of the legal and 
cultural debates. As described below, I will discuss these perspectives 
and explain their implications for the politics of marriage. 
In “Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation,”60 Ruthann 
Robson suggests that even if same-sex marriage has a necessary 
“civilizing” effect, same-sex marriage may end up serving the interests 
of an oppressive and unjust state.61 Since “the state itself creates the 
conditions that allow the married to be wealthier and healthier, through a 
legal regime that benefits and promotes marriage,” such a state-imposed 
marital regime “makes it difficult to disentangle [homosexuals’] personal 
interests and the state’s interests.”62 Further, “the regime of compulsory 
matrimony . . . makes it difficult to discern whether [homosexuals’] 
‘choices’ are truly voluntary.”63 Therefore, Robson claims that 
homosexuals should not adopt the state’s “preoccupation with equality”64 
- whether homosexuals are equal to heterosexuals - because in doing so, 
the so-called “equality” ultimately only satisfies the state’s interests in 
coercing and oppressing minorities through the apparatus of marriage. 
Homosexuals, therefore, ought to avoid the dangerous trap of choosing 
 60. See Robson, supra note 27, at 800-03. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 802. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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equality over their fundamental rights and autonomy.65
One of Robson’s biggest concerns is that, even if homosexuals were 
allowed to marry, the state explicitly excludes inquiries concerning 
“other minorities, such as cohabiting but unmarried heterosexuals, 
persons in intimate relationships with relatives, and persons who are 
simultaneously married to more than one person . . . .”66 She alleges that 
such “exclusions” would not achieve the ends of equality, and would 
only serve the interests of the state. 
Robson’s views are certainly not shared by all of the gay rights 
activists and scholars who are opposed to same-sex marriage. Robson’s 
methodology here is explicitly neo-Marxist and dialectical, which is at 
odds with the assimliation values and ideals of many proponents of 
same-sex marriage. However, I am not offering her theories here just to 
discuss how politically impractical they are; Robson’s theories are not 
meant to be politically “effective” or “feasible.” What I do want to 
emphasize here, however, is Robson’s unequivocal rejection of the 
notion of “equality” as a viable vehicle for gay liberation. Robson’s 
position here is directly counter to that of the assimliations in their view 
of homosexuality and of homosexuals’ position in society. 
The assimliations, and especially believers in the equal protection 
argument, believe marriage to be a symbolic and substantive means for 
homosexuals to anchor their legitimate place in society. Robson rejects 
the “civic” effects of marriage out of hand. For Robson, marriage not 
only perpetuates inequality and oppression, but the right to same-sex 
marriage would link homosexuals to this oppressive regime and make 
them complicit in their own oppression. 
Robson challenges the universality of the prohibition on incest, and 
points out that “the advocacy of same-sex marriage has failed to 
adequately explain or address the exclusion of others from the 
institutions of marriage or quasi-marital institutions.”67
 
Equal protection doctrine and our notions of equality have not proved 
capable of the task of divorcing considerations of gender from marital 
and quasi-marital institutions . . . [a]lthough same-sex marriage 
advocates have attempted to articulate distinctions between same-sex 
unions and incestuous or polygamous unions, notions of equal 
protection and equality are applicable to all of these relationships.68
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 747. 
 68. Id. 
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In other words, the fact that the assimliations’ notion of “equal 
protection” and “equality” all fail to include incestuous and polygamous 
relationships demonstrates the fallibility of the notion of equality. This is 
such an extreme view that as long as gay rights activists continue to back 
such radical notions, the voting mainstream will never accept such an 
argument. 
As Robson has correctly pointed out, the assimliations necessarily 
had rejected the idea that their hard-fought marriage right ought to be 
extended or related to those who practice polygamy or incest. The logic 
is simple. Polygamy and incest are legally outlawed and considered 
morally troubling and criminal in most communities in America. Same-
sex marriage proponents want to assimilate, to be recognized, and not to 
be stigmatized as are practitioners of polygamy and incest. Comparisons 
of homosexuality with polygamy and incest are troubling to gay men and 
lesbians. This is, of course, not Robson’s implication: her theory is that if 
an ideal equal protection theory can apply to homosexuals, then the 
theory should extend the right to any consenting adult, including 
polygamists and those who practice incest. 
Same-sex marriage proponents should vehemently reject both these 
unfair comparisons and Robson’s theory. They should make the case that 
homosexual relationships have nothing to do with the supposedly 
decadent practices of polygamy and incest. Further, assimliations should 
insist that because long-term homosexual relationships are just like long-
term heterosexual relationships, homosexuals have earned the right to 
marry.69
This line of argument is opposed by Robson, as well as the 
“changing marriage concept” proponents discussed in the previous 
section. These proponents believe that homosexuals do not need to adapt 
to the mainstream, heterosexual majority. Many of the gay rights 
activists reject outright the heterosexual conception of marriage. The 
assimliations, in contrast, have had to adopt the opposite strategy in order 
to convince the majority that homosexuals and homosexual relationships 
are in fact deserving of recognition. 
 
C.  Influence of the Alternative Theories in the Political Arena 
 
Not every supporter of gay rights falls neatly into one of the same-
sex marriage theories outlined in this article. For instance, it would be 
incorrect to assume that most assimliations unreservedly buy into the 
 69. There will be readers of this article who would think that those who practice incest or 
polygamy in a committed, long-term relationship may also have “earned” the right of marriage. But 
this is an extreme minority view, including the political and electoral arenas. 
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heterosexual/majority conception of marriage. The truth is that most 
people have their own ideas of what marriage is and what society expects 
of married people. The politics of marriage, however, do not permit each 
individual to define what is “normal” and “legal.” In politics, an interest 
group’s agenda needs to be unambiguous. Indeed, as the cultural war 
over same-sex marriage rages in ballots and courthouses around the 
country, can same-sex marriage proponents, especially the assimliations, 
afford not to define their conception of marriage in the most majoritarian 
terms? 
The truth is that by defining marriage in anything less than 
majoritarian terms, proponents of same-sex marriage face an 
insurmountable obstacle. In fact, by defining marriage as anything 
remotely close to non-monogamous relationships, polygamy, or incest, 
same-sex marriage proponents have little chance in winning the right to 
marry. 
This area is where the conservatives are able to soundly defeat same-
sex marriage proponents. The rhetoric of Robson and the “changing 
marriage concept” proponents are decried by these conservatives. Even 
the most tolerant-minded Christian conservatives see same-sex marriage 
as a predominantly moral issue; their refusal to lower the moral bar 
showcases their belief that homosexuality is a sin and should not be 
condoned through the institution of marriage.70 The less tolerant-minded 
conservatives would lump homosexuals, polygamists, and those who 
practice incest together.71 It is no surprise that much of their argument 
stems from the fact that because polygamists and blood relatives do not 
have the right to marry, neither should homosexuals. In other words, 
their “slippery slope” argument claims that allowing homosexuals to 
marry would allow anyone and everyone to marry whomever they 
wanted. 
Strangely enough, the slippery slope argument is where the 
“religious” right and the assimliations have some common ground. Both 
groups acknowledge that marriage and its normative content are to be 
differentiated from polygamists and others associated with the “slope.” 
In the same way, both the conservatives and the assimliations are 
attempting to define the “norm” of marriage, and this picture ought to 
include characteristics of a heterosexual marriage, not those of polygamy 
 
 70. See Robert Benne & and Gerald McDermott, Thirteen Bad Arguments for Same-Sex 
Marriage: Why the Rhetoric Doesn’t Stand Up Under Scrutiny, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Vol. 48, No. 
9, at 51-52 (September 2004); see also Edith M. Humphrey, What God Hath Not Joined: Why 
Marriage was Designed for Male and Female, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Vol. 48, No. 9, at 36-41 
(September 2004). 
 71. See Stanley Kurtz, The Libertarian Question: Incest, homosexuality, and adultery, 
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Apr. 30, 2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz043003.asp. 
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and incest. It is logical to infer that it is imperative for proponents of 
same-sex marriage to articulate this “common ground” and distinguish 
themselves from polygamists and persons engaging in incestuous 
relationships. It is where proponents of same-sex marriage, and 
especially the assimliations, urgently need to clarify their position. 
Unfortunately, proponents of same-sex marriage have not been 
successful in using such “common ground” in a visible and politically 
advantageous way. Instead, political conservatives have managed to 
associate homosexuals with stigmatized groups.72
 
D.  Conclusion 
 
Gay rights activists’ own lack of unity on the issue of same-sex 
marriage has proven costly. The disagreement on the principle of equal 
protection and the civic effects of marriage demonstrates that proponents 
of same-sex marriage are politically powerless in an area where they 
could have been stronger. There is no question that if proponents of 
same-sex marriage desire to rebound from the resounding defeat in the 
2004 election, they need to pay serious attention to the reasons for the 
defeat and their own mishandling of the marriage issue. 
Once again, the tension between the theories of equal protection and 
the right of privacy has been highlighted, in this case, in the discussion of 
the two alternative theories. Even though the equal protection rationale is 
politically more palatable for the assimliations, many gay activists prefer 
the right of privacy theory. In fact, many gay rights activists, including 
those who oppose same-sex marriage, are hostile toward the equal 
protection rationale. It is ironic that, given equal protection’s potential 
effectiveness and its historical resonance with majoritarian politics, it is 
the one theory that has been repeatedly rejected by progressive activists 
and scholars for ideological reasons. Their rejection of equal protection’s 
appeal in majoritarian politics is a troubling setback for those who debate 
the politics of marriage. 
In the following section, I will show how gay rights activists, and in 
particular, proponents of same-sex marriage, have repeatedly mishandled 
the politics of marriage because of their refusal to employ politically 
more pragmatic and effective means of achieving their goals. 
 
 
 72. The conservatives’ well-established and documented “slippery slope” argument will be 
described in more detail in Section V of this article. See, e.g., Stanley Kurtz, Rick Santorum Is Right: 
Meet the Future of Marriage in America, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, http://www.national 
review.com/kurtz/ kurtz2005 0323 0746 .asp. 
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V.  THE BACKLASH: MISHANDLING OF THE POLITICS OF MARRIAGE, AND 
RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT 
 
Although some may argue that the resounding defeat of the same-sex 
marriage issue at the 2004 polls was exacerbated by the use of the same-
sex marriage issue as a “hot-button” issue, it is clear that the strategy 
employed by same-sex marriage proponents was not effective in winning 
votes. Same-sex marriage proponents have many resources and strategies 
at their disposal. As Wolfson and other proponents of same-sex marriage 
have stated, the politics of marriage should include education, 
informative debate, and political arguments that link same-sex marriage 
and social issues.73 Before identifying what strategies the same-sex 
movement should take moving forward, this section will pinpoint the 
weak points in the same-sex marriage debate during 2004. Once these 
weak points are identified, the same-sex marriage movement will need to 
choose a single theory for the debate of same-sex marriages in the 
political arena. The chosen theory must have the potential to fix the weak 
points identified during 2004. As I has already mentioned, in his view, 
that theory should be the assimliation theory. Once the theory has been 
chosen, then the necessary and most appropriate strategies for that theory 
can be implemented. 
Two weak spots will be discussed in detail below. First, the same-sex 
marriage movement underestimated voters, and misunderstood the 
perception of its strategies on voters. Second, the same-sex marriage 
movement failed to respond effectively to the mainstream arguments 
presented by conservatives. 
 
A.  The “Average Joes” Go to the Polls 
 
If same-sex marriage is to be accepted, it must first be accepted by 
the voting public. In order to decide how to get the voting public to 
accept gay marriage, we must understand the voters’ concept of 
marriage. Gay right activists and scholars underestimated voters. The 
abovementioned statement by Richard Mohr about an average Joe being 
tongue-tied when asked about the definition of marriage is a case in 
point.74 Mohr’s attitude is reflected in his confident taunt: “Try it.”75
Mohr’s overconfidence is characteristic of gay activists’ mishandling 
of the politics of marriage. If you were to ask anyone who voted in 2004 
to define marriage, it is highly likely that he or she would know the 
 73. Wolfson, supra note 4, at 6-9. 
 74. Mohr, supra note 51, at 87. 
 75. Id. 
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meaning of marriage. In fact, many so-called “average Joe” voters in the 
battleground states would most likely answer that “marriage is between a 
man and a woman.” 
The sad truth is that even if Mohr’s proposition was true in 1995 
when the article was written, it was definitely no longer true by 2004. By 
that stage, the political debates about same-sex marriage had become 
highly controversial. If voters did not already possess some normative 
view on marriage, most likely they would have heard the definition 
brandished around in the media prior to going to the polls. This 
heightened awareness translated into votes against same-sex marriage. 
Proponents of same-sex marriage failed to clearly define their 
arguments, while political conservatives, especially those on the 
“religious right,” took the opportunity to do so. When proponents of 
same-sex marriage failed to reach the mainstream voters and the 
conservatives capitalized on these failures, the same-sex marriage agenda 
suffered at the polls.76
Not only did the same-sex marriage movement fail to articulate its 
views, the movement failed to consider how its strategies could be 
portrayed in the media or, otherwise, viewed by voters. The strategy of 
going straight to the executive branch of local government, bypassing the 
legislative and judicial branches, left a very negative impression with 
voters. When proponents of same-sex marriage celebrated on the steps of 
San Francisco City Hall by gaining marriage licenses from Gavin 
Newsome and his city clerks, the political right said that an arrogant 
public servant was practicing undemocratic and lawless politics, and that 
voters should put such behavior to an end.77
This misunderstanding of the so-called “average voters” has plagued, 
and will continue to plague, advocates of same-sex marriage. Proponents 
of same-sex marriage could have practiced assimliation politics by 
promoting the merits of same-sex marriage and appealing to the public’s 
sense of fairness, but they chose to stand behind someone like Newsome. 
The conservatives easily exploited these unwise decisions by denouncing 
them as lawless, undemocratic, and anti-majoritarian.78
Ultimately, the so-called “average Joes” did listen and did form an 
opinion regarding the issue of same-sex marriage. They went to the polls 
 76. See, e.g., Lou Chibbarro Jr., Gay Ponder Bush Victory, WASHINGTONBLADE.COM, Nov. 
5, 2004, http://www.washingtonblade.com/2004/11-5/news/national/ponder.cfm. 
 77. See e.g., Tony Perkins, Take a Stand for Marriage, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL 
ONLINE, http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=PD04E01, (last visited April 6, 2006); see also Carolyn 
Lochhead, supra note 20. 
 78. Charles Colson, Free for All: How Same Sex “Marriage” is Breaking Down the Rule of 
Law, PRISON FELLOWSHIP (May 24, 2004), http://www.pfm.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section= Break 
Point1&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=12508. 
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and voted in accordance with their opinions regarding the issue. This is 
especially true in states where ballots were cast to ban constitutionally 
same-sex marriages on a state level (and in some instances, civil unions 
as well). Instead of characterizing the success of these conservative 
efforts solely as forces of bias, prejudice, and intolerance against gay 
rights, it will serve proponents of same-sex marriage well to examine and 
critique their own failed strategies. 
 
B.  Conservative Theories Against Same-Sex Marriage 
 
The results of the 2004 election show that conservatives know how 
to reach voters. Although President Bush won only by a narrow margin, 
exit polls show a large majority of Bush voters turned out precisely 
because of the “morality” factor. Many observers also believe that John 
Kerry was defeated because he had a more ambiguous stance on “moral” 
issues such as same-sex marriage. Conservative commentators boasted of 
how the right had fired up “the base” and turned them out in 
unprecedented numbers to elect President Bush and more Republican 
members of Congress. 
It is important to note that voter mobilization is tremendously 
difficult in America under most circumstances.79 Although same-sex 
marriage was only one of several major issues in the 2004 campaign, the 
conservative right’s unambiguous position on the issue should not be 
overlooked. It would be too simpleminded to assume that the religious 
right had its way in 2004 simply because millions of Americans are 
homophobic and/or “unenlightened.”80 The key is to understand how the 
right was able to mobilize the voters. In other words, the right was 
successful because it played by the rules of majoritarian politics and was 
able to connect with the voters. 
Although many voters perceived same-sex marriage as a “moral” 
issue, conservatives were, generally speaking, not explicit in their 
rejection of homosexuality. Instead, the conservative discourse was 
unsophisticatedly centered on buzzwords, such as “family” and 
“children.” Conservative arguments, although based on buzzwords that 
elicit emotion instead of upon solid legal principles, have nevertheless 
proven effective and resonate with voters. 
 79. American political scientists have for decades written and commented on the difficulties 
of mobilizing voters in America. See, e.g., THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER (Knopt, 
2002). 
 80. This line of argument—equating President Bush’s victory as a sign of the voters’ lack of 
enlightenment—has been articulated by the nation’s several media outlets. The head of the “blame-
the-voters” camp is Pulitzer Prize-winning historian and cultural critic, Gary Wills, with his New 
York Times, The Day Enlightenment Went Out on November 4, 2004. 
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One of the more popular conservative theories is the procreation 
argument. The argument states that the legal institution of marriage is 
primarily for the purpose of producing children.81 Therefore, same-sex 
couples are not denied the right to marry because of some invidious 
discrimination against them, but rather because they cannot procreate. 
This line of argument insists that because procreation is concerned with 
society’s future, same-sex marriage is a threat. 
There is really no legal or even biological support for this argument. 
No state law now requires heterosexual couples to be capable of 
producing children before granting a marriage license. Some 
conservative social and biological scientists have attempted to show how 
human beings are designed “naturally” to mate with members of the 
opposite sex for the purpose of procreation.82 However, their “research” 
results are largely inconclusive. 
A corollary of the procreation argument is the childrearing argument. 
This line of argument points to conservative studies that show that 
children raised by homosexuals were more dissatisfied with their own 
gender, had homosexual experiences more frequently, and suffered a 
greater rate of molestation by family members.83 This argument has 
clashed with other studies that have drawn the opposite conclusions.84 It 
also ignores the fact that gay and lesbian “co-parent adoption” is legal in 
at least twenty-two states.85 Like the procreation argument, there is really 
no legal support for this argument. It also fails to recognize that many 
same-sex partners bring children to the same-sex union from prior 
heterosexual relationships. 
Another cornerstone of the conservative argument invokes the 
sanctity of marriage. This theory states that expanding the scope and 
definition of marriage to include any two people would damage and 
devalue marriage. If marriage ceased to be based on procreation, child 
rearing, and family, but rather were to be based on physical attraction, 
 81. Stephen C. Whiting, Same-Sex Marriage Pros and Cons: “Gay Marriage” is an 
Oxymoron, 19 ME. BAR J. 79, 82 (Spring 2004). 
 82. For this line of reasoning from the conservatives, see Hoover Institute’s Jennifer Roback 
Morse, and her work on the subject of marriage and gay marriage: Marriage and the Limits of 
Contract, HOOVER INSTITUTION, at http://www.policyreview.org/apr05/morse.html, (last visited 
April 6, 2006). 
 83. See Benne & McDermott, supra note 7, at 52. 
 84. See Dale Carpenter, Gay Marriage Helps Children, April 1, 2004, INDEPENDENT GAY 
FORUM ONLINE, http://www.indegayforum.org/authors/carpenter/carpenter44.html. For an example 
of a comprehensive study on this topic and arguments for same-sex couple parenting, see Judith 
Stacey and Timothy Biblarz’s article, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter? AM. 
SOC. REV. Vol. 66, No. 2 (April 2001). 
 85. See Joanna Grossman, “A New York Court Authorizes A Lesbian Couple’s Joint Adoption 
of A Child: Part of a Growing Same-Sex Adoption Trend,” FINDLAW, Apr. 19, 2004, http://writ 
.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20040419.html. 
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“the entire foundation for marriage would be eroded.”86 This theory 
claims that the erosion of marriage would lead to additional alleged 
social “evils,” such as teen pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and 
poverty. Here the slippery slope argument enters to warn against 
allowing marriage between those who cannot or should not procreate. 
Finally, if gay couples are permitted to marry, marriage “would decrease 
the incentive for opposite-sex couples to become married,” because 
marriage then would be based on physical attraction.87 None of these 
arguments has a clear legal or constitutional basis. Gretchen Van Ness, 
an advocate of same-sex marriage, has stated: 
 
Make no mistake about it, civil marriage is available to anyone over the 
age of eighteen who passes a syphilis test and is marrying someone of 
the opposite sex—that’s it! The marriage that the opposition [the 
conservatives] is protecting and all of this discussion about children, 
love, devotion, procreation, an exalted relationship in every way; it is 
not required by any state statute.88
 
Van Ness assumes that same-sex marriage is inevitable because the law 
simply does not support the conservatives’ “unsophisticated” argument. 
Van Ness is correct that factors like children, love, and procreation 
are completely absent from the statutes. She is wrong, however, in 
assuming that because these discussions are absent in the written law, 
that the conservative argument against same-sex marriage lacks merit or 
potency. On the contrary, it is highly likely that, because the arguments 
were about “family values” and “children,” they resonated more readily 
with voters, particularly the socially conservative ones. The arguments 
could be considered extremely convincing. However, convincing 
arguments do not always translate into votes. The fact that some voters 
already hold a particular opinion does not mean that they would go out 
and vote in a certain way simply because they were told to do so. 
These beliefs apparently were effective enough to get voters to the 
polls. “Family values” and the “welfare of children” are not just slogans 
created by the Republicans to draw out voters. Most candidates have 
spoken out about American “values.” These are issues that speak to 
voters. It is difficult to dispute that the 2004 election results, both locally 
and nationally, are about the triumph of “moral” or “conservative” values 
 86. Whiting, supra note 82, at 86; Benne & McDermott, supra 71 at 51. 
 87. Id. at 86-87. 
 88. Gretchen Van Ness, The Inevitability of Gay Marriage, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 563, 566 
(2004). 
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over liberal values.89 But the critical question is what exactly pushed 
these voters to oppose same-sex marriage on the basis of “conservative 
values.” Proponents of same-sex marriage should really ask how these 
voters could have been “swayed” to vote down the amendments against 
same-sex marriage. 
Proponents of same-sex marriage should have asked how they should 
have responded to conservatives’ ability to make same-sex marriage an 
issue of value and morality. They should have taken the time to educate 
the public about the merits of same-sex marriage in “family-friendly” 
terms. For example, same-sex marriage proponents could have explained 
how the ban on same-sex marriage deprives children of same-sex couples 
from enjoying the status of a family structure based on marriage and the 
benefits that flow from marriage. 
This section has examined how the issue of same-sex marriage has 
been “legitimized” in the politics of marriage. Conservatives have been 
much more conventional, modest, majoritarian, and effective. As a result, 
voters responded by going to the polls and voting against same-sex 
marriage. The fact that “moral” or “family-friendly” arguments are 
absent from “state statutes,” as Van Ness pointed out, becomes moot 
when voters in eleven states changed their state constitutions to 
specifically limit marriage to a heterosexual union. 
 
VI.  TOWARD AN ASSIMLIATION THEORY OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
 
Unless proponents of same-sex marriage become better prepared in 
promoting the benefits of same-sex marriage and become more 
assimliation in their rhetoric, they will continue to be marginalized. The 
passage of anti-same-sex marriage amendments in eleven states should 
serve as a warning. 
My argument is premised on the fact that proponents of same-sex 
marriage desire to win this right through the political process, and that 
this right is a winnable one. It is worthwhile to mention these two 
intuitive premises here because many proponents of same-sex marriage 
and gay right activists and scholars do not help their cause by their (1) 
anti-assimliation stance on same-sex marriage; (2) anti-assimliation 
stance on values that are at the core of society and civic participation; 
and (3) ignorance, misunderstanding, or underestimation of the 
conservative values that were used to argue against same-sex marriage. 
Gay scholars may scoff at my proposal for a more “assimilationist” 
 
 89. James Sterngold, Bush Reaches Out Moral Issues: Dems Caught By Surprise, at A1, 
Nov. 4, 2004, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLES. 
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stance. They will wonder why a group that has been historically 
mistreated and discriminated against would want to take a 
“compromised” or “assimilationist” stance on an issue that they care 
deeply about. My answer is threefold. First, if the politics of same-sex 
marriage is an arena in which proponents of same-sex marriage want to 
engage in, they have to “play by the rules” to win. It is evident that more 
perceived lawlessness at city halls around the country would do more 
harm than good for the cause. 
Second, regardless of what the more radical gay right activists and 
scholars say, “traditional” marriage values and ideals still hold a 
prominent place in American life, even when heterosexual couples have 
such trouble living up to these values, as evidenced, for example, by the 
nation’s high divorce rate.90 Championing “traditional” values has 
proven exceptionally advantageous. Radical gay rights activists and 
scholars’ criticisms of traditional marriage and family values only 
reinforce the perception that homosexuals are only interested in 
deconstructing more traditional notions of marriage and family. This 
idea, combined with the perception that proponents of same-sex marriage 
are subverting the law of marriage, is devastating to the advocacy of 
same-sex marriage rights. 
Third, proponents of same-sex marriage should reframe and 
communicate the same-sex marriage agenda in terms used by the 
conservatives, because “value discussions” need not be monopolized by 
the political right. The equal protection theory is one such discussion that 
proponents of same-sex marriage could use to appeal to the public (even 
though many gay activists and scholars oppose it). There is no reason for 
proponents of same-sex marriage not to talk about family values, 
monogamy, commitment, and other values-driven “buzz” words. It is 
puzzling that proponents of same-sex marriage are reluctant to speak 
about same-sex marriage in those terms. 
Again, radical gay rights activists and scholars would scoff at this 
notion as “assimilationist” and accommodating to the corrupting and 
oppressive interest of the state. The most conservative (or “essentialist”) 
faction probably never entertained such ideas. However, I do not believe 
that many Americans can be influenced by messages emanating from 
both sides. While they may be discomforted by “lawlessness” in city 
halls or the rulings of “activist” judges, at the same time, they are not 
hostile to homosexuals. 
As mentioned above, the values discussion should not be 
monopolized by conservatives, because there is no reason why gay 
 90. For reference to divorce statistics, see http://www.divorcereform.org/rates.html. 
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couples cannot talk about the values by which they live. Proponents of 
same-sex marriage, especially assimilationists, should resist the 
temptation to allow their more radical peers to deconstruct marriage. 
Assimilationists ought to reject the deconstructionist views outright, 
because these views cannot help the cause. 
Proponents of same-sex marriage should practice a more unified and 
assimilationist politics of marriage and quiet the dissident voices. This 
will never happen completely, but assimilationists should focus on 
talking more about these values. 
Dwight J. Penas’ article, “Bless the Tie that Binds: A Puritan-
Covenant Case for Same-Sex Marriage,” recognizes the importance of 
giving the support for same-sex marriage this kind of theological content 
and value.91 The theological content complements the legal arguments 
for same-sex marriage. As conservatives have so aptly demonstrated, talk 
about morals and values is more effective than academic and legal 
arguments. More importantly, this theological content and value directly 
rebut both conservatives’ and radical stereotypes of homosexuals. 
As the politics of marriage continues to play itself out, I believe 
proponents of same-sex marriage need to employ this kind of theoretical 
content for same-sex marriage not only to complement their legal and 
social policy arguments, but also to place it at the core of their advocacy. 
This theoretical content is something that most voters can accept. 
 
A.  Marriage as Covenant 
 
Penas’ Puritan-Covenant case for same-sex marriage is rooted in the 
understanding of Puritan ideology as a major influence on early 
American law, democracy, and society.92 Because Puritan theology has 
shaped church and evangelical organizations, it provides a moral and 
theological underpinning to same-sex marriage that modern 
conservatives may potentially accept. 
At the heart of Puritan thought was the principle of covenant. “A 
covenant is a mutually beneficial relationship formed when two parties 
pledge absolute faithfulness to each other.”93 The Puritans “structured 
their entire theological system around the notions of a covenant between 
God and humanity and of human covenants that reflected the divine-
 91. Dwight J. Penas, Bless the Tie that Binds: A Puritan-Covenant Case for Same-Sex 
Marriage, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE, 126 (Robert M. Baird & 
Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., Prometheus Books 1997). 
 92. Id. at 146-48. 
 93. Id. at 149. 
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human covenant.”94 For the Puritans, history was a series of covenants. 
First, God established a covenant with humanity by promising to lead 
and care for it, and in exchange, humanity pledged faithfulness to God. 
Even when humanity fell short, God never broke his covenant. In effect, 
God has continued to “work” by loving and leading humanity, while 
humanity (or in this case, the Puritans) has devoted its service and 
dedication to the Lord in gratitude and faithfulness.95
In applying this covenant relationship to society, Puritans maintained 
that human life “is essentially communal” and “defined in terms of 
relationships with others” and that covenant relationships between 
humans should reflect and parallel the covenant between God and the 
human race.96 For example, neighbors “worked” and “served” each other 
out of their devotion to God and to one another. 
Puritans understood marriage as a partnership in which spouses 
“undertook serious obligations” to each other.97 Puritans downplayed the 
view of marriage as an expression of the requirements of procreation, 
and emphasized mutual help, affection, and respect in marriage.98 The 
marriage covenant was only one of many social covenants that would 
serve the “iconic function” which exemplified “in microcosm the love 
and cooperation, and care that the city, state, and nation were to 
practice . . . “99 For example, those who held political power had a 
covenantal obligation to be responsible for the people that they ruled. 
The ruled had a covenantal obligation to obey their rulers. Those who 
were privileged or affluent had a covenantal obligation to provide for 
those who were not. Because the Puritans were highly conscious of their 
covenantal duties to each other, to society, and to the state, they had a 
profound respect for rules and social convention. All aspects of life were 
and had to be integrated under the rule of God and the “triparty 
agreement[s among] God, the civil ruler, and the people.”100
Covenant theory affirms the ideal that covenanting with one another 
is of the essence of being human, and that this ideal should be upheld by 
the state.101 Because of theological affirmation to covenantal 
relationships between individual to individual and individual to the state, 
Penas argues that a covenant “marriage” relationship for a gay couple 
would be supported by the Puritan doctrine of covenant theology. First, 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 149-50. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 150. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 154. 
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because the covenant relationship is the basic expression of being human 
and being responsible, by definition it contributes to the common good; 
to outlaw it would be detrimental to society.102 He also argues that 
covenant theory “transcends” the privacy theory behind the same-sex 
marriage debate by recognizing the importance of each unit of committed 
relationship in society.103 And finally, he argues that the covenant theory 
carries an assimilationist component by stating that, because human 
beings are all equal before God, covenant equity requires equality of 
participation in society. Such participation in society is “an end in itself,” 
wherein equal participation of all in the end benefits the society. Such 
participation brings about additional benefits in the Puritan sense, 
because participation in the covenantal relationships preserves order and 
confers equality upon all members of a society.104 Covenant equality also 
means that people share equally in the benefits of the whole society, for 
“[i]t is incumbent on a legal system to remove any and all barriers to full 
and equal participation by all people.”105 The goal is to have mutual 
commitment. Same-sex marriages—if covenantal—ought to be 
recognized by society as essential to the covenant principle. 
Many people could be skeptical of applying this theological agenda 
to the politics of the present day, and especially to the advocacy of same-
sex marriage. The more radical theorists could be critical and argue that 
this kind of equal participation theory is illusory and unrealistic because 
of the oppressive nature of the system and the predominant interest of the 
state in discriminating against the minority. 
The counterargument would be that this kind of theological and 
philosophical argument is really not so farfetched. The theory closely 
resembles the theory of equal protection. Furthermore, Penas suggests 
that this theory complements the political and legal strategies for same-
sex marriage by providing not only a theological or religious basis for 
same-sex marriage, but also a historical argument, since Puritan 
philosophy has intellectually and politically shaped modern American 
institutions.106
 
B.  Puritanism and Fundamentalism 
 
To see how Penas’ theory can be politically effective and successful 
in today’s cultural and political debates regarding same-sex marriage, it 
 102. See id. at 155-56. 
 103. See id. at 155. 
 104. See id. at 156-58. 
 105. Id. at 156. 
 106. See id. at 146. 
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is helpful to briefly discuss the nature of the religious fundamentalism in 
America today; the political manifestations of this kind of religious 
conservatism has already had great impacts on the same-sex marriage 
debate, as discussed in previous sections of this paper. 
Religious fundamentalism, i.e., the current evangelical movement, in 
America shares many characteristics with the Puritanism that Penas 
discusses. Both share the Judeo-Christian religious tradition and the same 
types of family-centered conservative values, although the 
fundamentalists do not share the Puritans’ vision of the state. 
Additionally, both value the concept of law and order, though not for the 
same reason. It is unnecessary to discuss the theological content of 
American religious fundamentalism here, because it is more important to 
see the political manifestations of this kind of conservatism. As 
previously stated, the religious right identifies itself strongly with the 
nuclear family.107 Many religious conservatives share Bush’s vision of 
“compassionate conservatism.”108 In this vision, the state acts as the 
guardian of these families and their most cherished values, and reaches 
out to those who are less fortunate. This vision does not necessarily 
translate into policy, although it has great political appeal. 
Therefore, proponents of same-sex marriage should regard Penas’ 
theory, at the very least, as a bridge to more socially conservative voters. 
Penas’ theory should have great appeal to gay rights activists if they 
believe that it is imperative to communicate to the public that same-sex 
marriage poses no threat whatsoever to the social fabric. Penas’ theory 
could prove that the goal of same-sex marriage is for the good of society 
and for building communities in which traditional values can thrive. 
Unless same-sex marriage advocates communicate its substantive merits 
and value, it will be impossible to shatter the negative and unfair 
stereotypes of gay couples, because many voters do not hear about or 
understand gay couples. 
The average voters see only two sides of the debate. For example, 
while the gay rights activists paraded in San Francisco during Mayor 
Newsome’s “legalization” of same-sex marriage in the city, an average 
television viewer may have also seen protesters carrying signs 
condemning homosexuality, vigorously protesting against the city 
issuing marriage license to same-sex couples.109 These messages leave 
 107. For example, the Family Research Council and Focus on the Family are powerful 
Christian fundamentalist political organizations that have regularly championed traditional family 
values and have been vocal against same-sex marriage. See www.frc.org and www.family.org. 
 108. See Robert Westbrook, Compassionate Conservatism: What It Is, What It Does, and How 
It Can Transform America, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Sept. 13, 2000, http://www.findarticles.com 
/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_25_117/ai_65702750. 
 109. See Broadcast Transcripts, Protest over gay marriage in San Francisco, CNN.COM, 
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little room for meaningful discussion. As a result, they are likely to 
oppose same-sex marriage. Penas’ message interjects substance, merits, 
and values into the conceptual framework of arguments for same-sex 
marriage. 
My point is that support for same-sex marriage needs to have a more 
substantive, value-based identity. As Penas has implied, there is nothing 
actually wrong with the core values of conservative fundamentalism and 
Puritanism. Substantively, these values do not necessarily contradict 
progressive causes (although the likes of the radical feminists would 
disagree). There is no reason that a gay couple cannot say with 
confidence that they have the same family and community values that 
other Americans do. If they have spoken, their voices have not been 
heard by voters or were muted by other distracting elements. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
I have pointed out the flaws in the reasoning and strategies of 
proponents of same-sex marriage. First, proponents of same-sex marriage 
have largely succeeded in bringing same-sex marriage into the headlines 
and initiating intense discussions. However, proponents of same-sex 
marriage have failed to convey the merit of same-sex marriage to the 
public. Underlining this failure is gay rights activists’ inability to educate 
the public and present the issue as a win-win situation. They have also 
underestimated the power and intelligence of the voters. 
Second, when gay rights activists’ presentation of the issue is less 
about equal protection and equal participation but more about “their” 
fundamental rights and “their” notions of relationships and family, the 
public is unlikely to understand the merits of same-sex marriage and its 
benefits to society. In the politics of marriage and the majoritarian 
political process, average voters then would most likely follow the 
conservatives’ platform, which demands a return to fundamental values. 
Furthermore, in presenting the legal and theoretical merits of same-
sex marriage, gay rights activists cannot agree on the substance and the 
meaning of marriage and its goal. Beneath all of the political failures of 
same-sex marriage advocacy is a more important question of what same-
sex marriage should look like. But without some kind of consensus, the 
politics of same-sex marriage is muddled and ineffective. 
Finally, Penas’ covenant relationship model—which closely 
resembles the “ideal” model of heterosexual couples—is a viable model 
for same-sex marriage advocates because it is not only politically more 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0402/20/lol.05.html (last visited April 6, 2006). 
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viable, but because it presents a complete picture of how gay couples 
function and coexist for the good of the state, the community, and 
themselves. This is not a reactionary point of view; it is one of many 
potential models of same-sex marriage. Such a model is important, 
because same-sex marriage is a right that is to be won. But to achieve 
this end, one needs to understand what one is fighting for. Having only 
an incomplete picture means one does not present a credible or 
convincing picture to the public. 
Critics can reject this model and point to the self-interest of the state 
and the discriminatory nature of society as warnings against adopting this 
point of view. However, if gay rights activists are already fighting for the 
right to marry, then the public has the right to know what same-sex 
marriage entails. Penas’ theory is only a start. It is up to those who 
engage in the politics of marriage to decide what they want. It is critical 
that the proponents of same-sex marriage make up their minds about 
same-sex marriage before the rest of the country does it for them. 
 
